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Michael LeMahieu’s first book both makes the case and develops a 
method for reading postwar US fiction’s philosophical logic in terms of 
its immediate academic milieu, rather than through lenses imposed by 
later critics and theorists. Tracing literary responses to logical positivism’s 
precedence in mid-century US philosophical culture, LeMahieu demon-
strates this positivism’s determining but curiously disavowed role in the 
rhetoric of the era’s university-centric fiction, from Flannery O’Connor’s 
“Good Country People” (1955) to a swan song in Don DeLillo’s End 
Zone (1972). Dense with both archival research and philosophical exegesis, 
LeMahieu’s project is narrowly conceived in all the best and some of the 
less appealing senses of the term. An unnecessary reticence about its in-
tended range of implication leaves the book open to substantial quibbles, 
but at its core stand, unquibblably, a revisionary history of philosophical 
circulation and authorial inspiration, a fresh genealogy of the postmodern, 
and an exemplification of a method.
 Postmodern theory’s autobiography—a “narrative of progress” about 
its triumph over a still unrevised caricature of “positivism as an ahis-
torical, universal idea that can show up anywhere at any time but will 
always be rejected easily and uniformly” (16)—has, LeMahieu suggests, 
given us a distorted and badly taxonomized sense of the postwar literary 
landscape. Treating logical positivism’s absolute separation of facts from 
values as “the central moral question of the period,” he reads his fictions 
“not [as] a simple rejection of logical positivism but instead a sustained 
aesthetic response to its doctrines” (96). He thus revises “logical positiv-
ism’s ahistorical afterlife in literary studies” (17) through historical ac-
counts both of postwar fiction’s uneasy, non-uniform engagement with 
the fact/value distinction, and of the way in which that fiction came to 
be so consistently read in relation to a “concept of postmodernism . . . 
premised on not knowing, and thus not owning, its debt to logical posi-
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tivism.” Foregrounding postmodernism’s and logical positivism’s mutually 
repressed but clearly “shared emphasis on the contingencies of value and 
the constructions of fact,” LeMahieu highlights not just the opposition’s 
tendentious origins, but also its far-reaching effects on literary history.
 From these revisions, new taxonomical possibilities arise, among them 
that we might treat works that pursue the separation of fact and value 
as philosophically “modern” and thus apply “postmodern” to works that 
foreground the project of morally and aesthetically reconciling the two 
terms. LeMahieu frames his four central authors—O’Connor, John Barth, 
Saul Bellow, and Thomas Pynchon, usually read as partisans in opposed 
camps of tradition and experiment—as each differently but definitely 
postmodern, “major writers responding to one of the most pressing 
philosophical and aesthetic problems of the period” (153).
 Fictions of Fact and Value thus unites two channels in current literary 
scholarship. On one hand it’s a peer of books like Lisi Schoenbach’s Prag-
matic Modernism and Robert Chodat’s Worldly Acts and Sentient Things—or 
in related registers recent work by Amy Hungerford on religion or Steven 
Meyer on science—which have attempted to make twentieth-century 
space for the sort of investigation of US literature’s interactions with 
US philosophy that has long been standard in work on the nineteenth 
century. On the other hand, LeMahieu challenges postmodernism’s pu-
tative ahistoricity in the manner of less specifically philosophical books 
by Daniel Grausam (on the looming nuclear threat), Marianne DeKoven 
(on the popularization of political radicalism), and Steven Belletto (on 
international relations and the game-theoretical refiguration of chance). 
The eight-year span of Fictions of Fact and Value’s four central works pin-
points a precise moment of cultural intersection, which the book then 
addresses at the methodological intersection of philosophical elaboration 
and historicist revision.
 LeMahieu argues not only that his authors engaged with logical 
positivism, but that they shared a curious disavowal of doing so: theirs 
is “a genealogy that is often erased in the very texts where it registers 
and disowned by the very authors it includes” (6). This is the “erasure” 
of his title, and examining it demands a method that, “unlike many 
philosophical approaches to literature, combines theoretical and archi-
val methods.” Recovering the overt engagement recorded in drafts and 
notes makes the published fictions’ philosophical origins legible, “woven 
in the fabric and hidden in plain sight” (5). LeMahieu thus more often 
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finds his “emblem[s]” (121, 156) in the archives than in the published fic-
tion—for instance in the Bellow draft in which a character tells his wife 
“no more logical positivism for me” (qtd. in LeMahieu 122). LeMahieu 
provides a nearly full-page reproduction of the relevant page, which 
Bellow cancelled under a single cross; this reproduction of an erasure of 
a renunciation neatly emblematizes Fictions of Fact and Value’s own trac-
ing of philosophical influence, aesthetic response, and strangely covered 
tracks. Correspondingly, the era ends once such erasures can themselves 
be represented in the published fictions: as End Zone closes, a student 
sees wall-space where he imagines a poster of Wittgenstein used to hang, 
and in LeMahieu’s neat reading, this “perspicuously captures both the 
pervasiveness of logical positivism’s influence and the abruptness of its 
obsolescence: a once iconic philosophy now reduced to tape remnants” 
(15). 
 To so deliberately row from the archival to the aesthetic also requires 
LeMahieu to develop a task-specific form of literary reading, elaborated in 
his first chapter through an account of the “negative” structural rhetoric 
of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Against the scientistic caricature of the Tracta-
tus circulated by early objectors like Adorno and perpetuated by logical 
positivism’s Anglo-American popularizers, LeMahieu offers a technical 
and rhetorical account of how “the relationship between the positive 
and speculative propositions in the Tractatus constitutes a dialectic of fact 
and value, one that the text ultimately ‘suspends,’ in Adorno’s sense of 
that term” (36). In this reading, Wittgenstein ultimately indicates value’s 
immanence by leaving it unwritten. Through his four subsequent chap-
ters, LeMahieu isomorphically applies this logic to the way that, as the 
era’s authors erased the obvious signs of their engagement with logical 
positivism from the surface of their texts, Wittgenstein himself became a 
form-organizingly absent presence in their fictions. 
 LeMahieu’s account of “Good Country People” uses O’Connor’s let-
ters to show how she, like Wittgenstein, tried to convey the “feeling” of 
immanent values by creating worlds in which only the facts are writable: 
she “warns writers motivated by religious considerations against enshrining 
‘the mystery without the fact’” and “insists, often belligerently, on depicting 
the world that is the case, but she does so with an eye to revealing what is 
absent or negated in that world” (53). For this Wittgensteinian O’Connor, 
“to supply the positive content that [she] withholds is to contradict her 
negative aesthetic” (85). That withheld content—especially grace, the fic-
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tion’s unwritable moral and conceptual center—is, like value in Wittgen-
stein, not a blank to be filled or an abjectly separate realm but a factual 
and effectual absence.
 In his next chapter, LeMahieu translates the extensive philosophi-
cal debates contained in Barth’s The End of the Road into the terms of 
an underlying preoccupation with the fact/value distinction. Taking the 
novel’s action as a pessimistic exemplification of the dominant philoso-
phy’s limitations, LeMahieu charts how “Barth exhausts the logic of logi-
cal positivism, stretching it to its reductio ad absurdum in order to reveal 
what he, like O’Connor, considers its pernicious ethical consequences” 
(100). LeMahieu suggests that this silence-reaching critique fails—due to 
the novel’s realist commitment to the very fact-presenting capacities of 
the normative language that it wants to show is exhausted—to achieve 
anything like Wittgenstein’s value-enshrining redemption of silence. The 
End of the Road thus becomes the point from which Barth’s subsequent 
manifesto “The Literature of Exhaustion” embarks, rejecting realist form 
along with the conception of fact-contingent value that the earlier novel 
took seriously enough to try to exhaust.
 LeMahieu delves deeper into the archives to trace the composition 
history of Bellow’s thinly disguised sketch, in “Zetland: By a Character 
Witness,” of “his childhood friend, intellectual companion, and literary 
rival Isaac Rosenfeld” (118). Setting the story in the context of Bellow’s 
own academic and artistic education, LeMahieu frames “Zetland” as the 
point at which Bellow’s career locked into the “attempt to pick up what 
positivism leaves behind: literature’s claim to what Rosenfeld described 
as ‘that nonpropositional, vague, metaphysical anguish which is nonsense 
technically, yet morally often the watershed of sanity.’”
 The book ends with an examination of the late revisions to the 
chapter of Thomas Pynchon’s V. in which a scientist tracks atmospheric 
patterns that, on decoding, spell out the first proposition of the Tractatus. 
The archive reveals that Pynchon originally gave logical-positivist talk to 
his characters rather than to the ether, cutting lengthy conversations on 
the topic from the chapter’s published version. LeMahieu thus establishes 
that “Pynchon’s postmodern coupling of science and fiction emerges out 
of a sustained engagement with what the narrator, in an earlier draft of V., 
describes as ‘the dilemma of the scientist or positivist in today’s decadent 
world’” (155), a revelation that grounds a fresh take on the ethical and 




 As these brief summaries show, LeMahieu’s structured synthesis of 
historicism, philosophy and close-reading—starting with the archive to 
demonstrate the presence of an erasure, whose logic then grounds a read-
ing with wider implications—is flexible enough to distinguish as well as 
connect the texts under discussion. It is, in this sense, a viable methodol-
ogy. Even so, the relation between the archive, the concept of erasure, and 
the mode of negative reading isn’t the same in each chapter. As a rule, 
these terms generate stronger and more widely applicable readings the 
more clearly the erasure each chapter traces is ratified by the archive.
 On this basis, the Barth chapter stands out as a weak link. Treating a 
novel so overtly composed of philosophical discussion without delving 
into the archive, LeMahieu leaves himself little room to do more than 
translate that discussion into logical positivist terms. Emphasizing “The 
Literature of Exhaustion”’s opening repudiation of realism, rather than 
the positive case it goes on to make for recuperating old styles, LeMahieu 
fails to address The End of The Road’s reflexive modulations of style, or 
the way in which these suggest that the narrator Jacob Horner’s event-
saturating nihilism follows from his retrospective knowledge of his value-
laden role in the facts he recounts. Taking Horner at his motive-denying 
word, treating his philosophical musings as the novel’s own critique, 
LeMahieu misses the possibility that Barth characterized Horner’s resort 
to value-scepticism precisely as an evasion of moral responsibility, thus 
pointing beyond Horner’s tendentious “exhaustion” to an implied moral 
judgment of his evasion as evidence of potentially unexhausted values. In 
this chapter, then, LeMahieu’s departure from archival methods hinders 
his usually astute separation of philosophical implications from paraphrases 
of philosophical content.
 If the exhaustively exegetical Barth chapter results in the only 
unconvincing reading in the book, the Bellow chapter that follows 
showcases LeMahieu at his best. The tracing of the gradual erasure of 
logical-positivist inspiration through the various drafts of “Zetland” puts 
this little-studied “sketch” convincingly at the philosophical heart of Bel-
low’s career: its efforts to treat values as factual in the face of a world that 
offers no obvious warrant account equally for the secular mysticism of 
Henderson the Rain King and the turn to irascible conservatism in Mr Sam-
mler’s Planet. LeMahieu goes further, finding parallels with Wittgenstein in 
Bellow’s treatment of death as a silence/language/feeling nexus, reveal-
ing in passing that Bellow’s famously reductive, philosophically illiterate 
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female characters were not just a matter of negligence but a concerted 
construction mappable through the drafts, and reaching beyond Bellow 
to briefly limn logical positivism’s role in the development of theories of 
fictional reference in the period. Here, his method proves just how much 
generalizing weight it can bear.
 It’s the Pynchon chapter, though, that stands as the clearest emblem, 
to use LeMahieu’s term, of the book’s achievements and shortcomings. Its 
archival revelations ramify impressively: establishing just how overt logical 
positivism’s role was in the original draft, LeMahieu elaborates patterns 
barely acknowledged in the large body of existing Pynchon criticism. 
He gives the novel’s recursive interrogation of the concept of “love” a 
foundation in logical positivism’s attempts to write off swathes of human 
experience as meaningless because they are “merely” emotive, and along 
these lines recontextualizes the role of the ineffable in Pynchonian ethics. 
More fundamentally, he offers one of the more substantive expansions of 
the logic of “world” in Pynchon since Brian McHale’s now-axiomatic ac-
count of postmodern ontological indeterminacy. Treating Pynchon’s many 
“beyonds” as realms in which the values displaced by a positivist world 
might still inhere, he revises McHale’s notion that postmodern fiction’s 
proliferating worlds are necessarily unhierarchized in relation to fact. As 
in the Bellow chapter, then, LeMahieu here develops an archival kernel 
into a convincing account of a novelist’s career-long preoccupations. The 
problem is that with these insights the book abruptly ends.
 With only the briefest of speculations on why Pynchon might have 
cut the logical positivism material, and an even briefer survey of the fact/
value question’s contemporary literary survival, the book closes. This re-
minds us that, while LeMahieu’s historical and author-specific claims are 
rigorously documented, his treatment of their implications is sporadic, 
even reticent. Sometimes this is symptomatic of, and sometimes it exacer-
bates, the limitations of his narrow focus. Throughout, two claims remain 
unclear: first, whether his texts represent logical positivism’s impact on 
the whole field, or just a subset, of American literature; second, whether 
logical positivism was a major factor in these texts’ development, or the 
major factor. This leaves the whole project open to criticism in ways that 
more explicit acknowledgement of its limits might have foreclosed.
 Of these, the most significant—bearing more directly on LeMahieu’s 
claims than other equally conspicuous limits of demographic diversity—
is the fact that all these fictions either orbit university settings or star 
PhD-holders and scientists. The secondary cast of fiction-makers who 
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flesh out the chapters—William Gass, Ronald Sukenick, Iris Murdoch, 
Mary McCarthy, Walker Percy—only compound this issue. Even were 
LeMahieu to acknowledge that this is only a subset of his titular era’s 
American literature, the question would still remain as to how its insti-
tutional strictures channelled its forms and ideas. That logical positivism 
“did not sponsor didactic fictions so much as provoke aesthetic responses” 
(20) doesn’t mean that its political and institutional sponsorship had no 
bearing on the shape of those responses. Brief references to scholarship 
on the era’s university context—for example, to John McCumber’s work 
on politically driven funding constraints on philosophical research, or to 
Mark McGurl on O’Connor and the MFA system—don’t go far enough 
toward addressing this question. From McGurl to Hungerford to Steven 
Schryer, recent sociologically-inflected work on postwar US fiction’s 
institutional contexts offers resources that could complement and refine 
the philosophical and historicizing approaches from which LeMahieu 
exclusively draws his coordinates. Scholars in that sociological line of 
work, though, will find great raw material here.
 Similar issues arise from the Wittgenstein-centrism of LeMahieu’s 
version of logical positivism. Since so much of LeMahieu’s contextual-
izing of Wittgenstein’s philosophical reception comes through European 
figures like Adorno and Murdoch, it’s never quite clear how this recep-
tion migrated to US philosophy or literature. LeMahieu’s dealings with 
US logical positivists are perfunctory. The revelation that “Zetland” was 
originally titled “Zetland and Quine,” for example, gets no further gloss 
than that the relevant Quine is the one whose initials were WVO. It’s 
surely pertinent that Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (which Le-
Mahieu does briefly cite in his chapter on Barth) was the highest-profile 
early counter-positivist challenge to emerge from within Anglo-American 
philosophy. But beyond Wittgenstein LeMahieu is reluctant to venture, 
leaving it unclear whether the US logical positivists with whom his au-
thors actually shared university turf were ever inscribed enough in their 
colleagues’ fiction to get erased—let alone how, why, and how differently 
to Wittgenstein.
 The other flaw of range is LeMahieu’s tendency to focus on logi-
cal positivism in analytical isolation even after acknowledging the many 
philosophical registers in a given text. His introduction approvingly 
quotes a review of End Zone to the effect that “each of the characters 
speaks a jargon that mocks its origins, a reduction to the absurd of what 
once passed for thought” (qtd. in LeMaheiu 7), but no jargon beyond 
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that of logical positivism subsequently gets addressed. The Barth chapter 
convincingly frames the fact/value distinction as the conceptual bedrock 
underlying The End of the Road’s more overt references to Kierkegaard, 
Sartre, pragmatism, and the Greeks. Elsewhere, though, LeMahieu’s focus 
on logical positivism as a master key, rather than as part of an interacting 
philosophical array, leads to moments that can remind one of Pynchon’s 
monomaniacal Stencil: the suggestion that we should add “value” to the 
many things that the elusive “V.” might stand for, for example, or the 
claim that the centrality of “show don’t tell” to pedagogy in the MFA 
programs for which O’Connor blazed a trail is best understood in terms 
of Wittgenstein’s distinction between showing and saying.
 On all these fronts, LeMahieu’s reluctance to extend his argument’s 
implications beyond the home-turf of PhD fiction seems a missed oppor-
tunity. Could we find evidence of logical positivism’s influence, however 
differently transmuted and erased, in further-flung but still philosophi-
cally coherent genres of the period, like black expatriate existentialism, 
socialist realism, the Beat movement, or the whole generation of poets 
Charles Altieri saw cohering around the fact/value question in the early 
1970s? (LeMahieu never quite clarifies whether or why fiction’s engage-
ment with logical positivism was generically distinct.) It seems plausible, 
but LeMahieu’s method is so finely tuned to the particular group of 
university-centric authors he addresses, his account of the philosophy so 
beholden to one philosopher, his consequence-tracing so narrowly trained 
on the concept of postmodernism, that we must await the work of future 
scholars in order to find out. 
 Yet the fact that so many questions about the scope and implication 
of LeMahieu’s argument remain is itself a testimony to the rigor and 
significance of its core. Whereas Chodat—whose account of “agency”’s 
parallel conceptual developments in mid-century Anglophone philosophy 
and literature is probably Fictions of Fact and Value’s nearest predecessor—
deliberately downplays the question of documented influence in order to 
trace an almost century-long literary-philosophical zeitgeist, LeMahieu’s 
archives of direct influence bestow precision on his readings and force on 
his revisions by their very concentration. That his approach so comple-
ments Chodat’s helps clinch their shared claim: that insofar as literary 
study has accepted the continental/analytic philosophical distinction 
and enthusiastically picked a side, it has wilfully blinded itself to much of 
what’s going on in twentieth-century US fiction. As archival material on 
this generation of authors becomes increasingly accessible, LeMahieu’s 
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method should take on an exemplary role. This is philosophical literary 
study done well, and done well about a philosophy long caricatured as 
inimical to literary experience.
 LeMahieu notes that “logical positivism never spawned a cultural 
style; to the contrary, it seemed to lack all style” (2). His diligently unfash-
ionable work calls to mind Schoenbach’s recuperation of the philosophi-
cal centrality of “habit” to modernist fiction’s methods and imperatives, 
against the attractive but long institutionally defanged preoccupation with 
aesthetic “shock.” Putting a glamorless philosophy convincingly at the 
heart of twentieth-century literature, Fictions of Fact and Value significantly 
advances our understanding of what the more insistently hip claims of 
conventionally postmodern theory and criticism have obscured. Though 
the book doesn’t always provide them with clear signposts, anyone work-
ing on intellectual history and conceptual implication across the whole 
range of postwar fiction should be building on its revisions for the fore-
seeable future.
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